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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRANSAMERICA Case No. 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 12265 
Defendant and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAN ALLISON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a &ummary judgment 
entered in favor of Western Casualty and Surety 
Company (hereinafter referred to as Western) and 
Transamerica Insurance Company (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Transamerica) declaring that defendant, 
Dan Allison, and the estate of his deceased son, Rick 
Lee Allison, were not entitled to coverage under auto-
mobile liability insurance policies issued by Western 
and Transamerica. 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by 
Western and Transamerica seeking a declaration of 
the court that Dan Allison and the estate of his son, 
Ricky Lee Allison, were not entitled to coverage for 
liability arising from an automobile accident under 
automobile liability policies issued by said compan-
ies. Dan Allison filed a Motion for Summary J udg-
ment seeking a declaration that there was coverage 
under both policies. The trial court granted the Mo-
tions of Western and Transamerica and denied the 
Motion of Dan Allison and entered judgment accord-
ingly. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to give more specific record references 
and in order to supplement the facts as stated in ap-
pellant's brief, respondent Western will restate the 
factual context of this appeal. 
On January 2, 1968, Western issued an auto-
mobile policy to Dan Allison, the named insured. The 
policy, which was in effect at the time of the accident 
in question, provided insurance coverage for Mr. Al-
lison and his f arnily for those instances specifically 
contracted for in the policy. 
On May 18, 1968, the appellant and James H. 
Maddox, appellant's son-in-law, desired to attend a 
horse show in Price, Utah. However, because it was 
2 
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necessary to take the vehicle normally used by Rick 
Lee Allison, appellant's son, in his employment as a 
dairy worker, appellant asked Mr. Maddox if Ricky 
could use the Maddox jeep for that purpose. (Jam es 
Maddox deposition, p.4). Mr. Maddox consented but 
expressly told both Mr. Allison and Rick that the jeep 
was only to be used for the purpose of driving to the 
Christiansen farm where the milking was to be per-
formed. (James Maddox deposition, pp. 5-7). Mr. 
Maddox also informed his own son, Steve, that Rick 
was only to use the jeep for that specific puJtOse. (De-
position of Steve Maddox, p. 16). 
Rick Allison obtained possession of the jeep 
from Mr. Maddox. That evening Steve Maddox, 17 
year old son of James Maddox, learned that Rick was 
using the jeep to drive around the Heber-Midway 
area. Because Mr. Maddox had specifically said that 
he did not want Rick to use the jeep to drive around 
town, Steve and a friend began searching for Rick 
and the jeep. (Steve Maddox deposition p. 20). After 
a fruitless search, Steve located the jeep at Heber 
High School where a dance was being held. Rick was 
told by Steve that he had better take the jeep back to 
Rick's house until he needed it for his milking job the 
following morning. Rick agreed to do this and took 
the jeep, along with two girls and one boy, back to his 
house. (Steve Maddox deposition p. 22). Shortly 
thereafter Steve arrived at Rick's house. At this time 
Rick and Steve got into an argument about the jeep's 
use which finally ended in Steve taking the vehicle 
3 
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back to the Maddox residence. (Steve Maddox depo-
sition pp. 24-25). 
Upon arriving home Steve parked the jeep and 
drove back to the high school in his own car. While 
he was there he learned that the two girls with Rick 
had not returned to the dance. Steve called Rick at 
home and asked him if he had any way of taking the 
two girls home. Rick replied that he did not have any 
transportation available so Steve went home and took 
the jeep back to the Allison residence. (Steve Maddox 
deposition pp. 26-27). When he arrived, the two boys 
apologized for their previous flareup. Steve told Rick 
to ''take the girls home with it [the jeep], just don't 
rod 'it and run all my gas out." (Steve Maddox depo-
sition p. 27). 
Rick Allison, Blaine Sweat, and the two girls : 
then drove around in the jeep until they arrived at 
the Hub Cafe and Service Station in Heber City. It 
was here that they met Craig Fuhriman and David ' 
Lund. Mr. Fuhriman and Lund told Rick that they 
had run out of gas and asked if Rick would help them. 
Upon being asked where the car was, Mr. Fuhriman 
replied, "It's about 20 miles back up the canyon." 
(Craig Fuhriman deposition pp. 14-15). The boys 
left, took the girls home, and returned back to the 
service station. 
Although the service station did not have a gas 
can, it apparently did have a siphoning hose. They , 
drove to the area where the car was stranded, found ' 
4 
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a service station nearby, and awakened the atten-
dant. Upon learning that the station did not have a 
gas can, Mr. Fuhriman purchased two dollars worth 
of gas for the jeep. (Craig Fuhriman deposition p. 
17) . The parties then proceeded westbound past the 
stalled automobile, made a "U" turn and parked par-
allel to the Fuhriman vehicle. Thus, the stalled car 
was facing west and was about 3 feet from the edge 
of the road while the jeep was facing east adjacent 
to the car. (Craig Fuhriman deposition p. 19-20). 
At this time the emergency flashers of the jeep as 
well as the headlights were in operation. No lights 
of the stalled vehicle were on. Rick attempted to si-
phon, but got a full mouth of gasoline. While Rick 
was trying to clear the gasoline from his throat, 
Blaine Sweat undertook the siphoning. (Craig Fuhri-
man deposition p. 25). It was at this time that Mr. 
Fuhriman saw an oncoming car and shouted a warn-
ing to the two boys. Before the boys could escape, a 
car driven by Harold Sergent crashed into the stalled 
car. (Craig Fuhriman deposition pp. 29-30). Mr. 
Fuhriman, although being hit by some flying object, 
managed to get up to assist the injured. Shortly there-
after, another car approached, but instead of stop-
ping, crashed squarely into the Maddox jeep. None of 
the victims of the first accident were harmed by this 
second accident, however. (Craig Fuhriman deposi-
tion p. 36). As a result of the first accident Rick Alli-
son was instantly killed and Blaine Sweat was fatally 
injured. 
5 
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Following the accident, several separate actions 
were brought as noted in appellant's brief. This Court 
has already decided one such action in Sweat vs. 
Fuhriman, 23 Utah 2d 331, 463 P.2d 3 (1969). As 
also noted, Wes tern and Transamerica have consis-
tently refused to defend Dan Allison and the estate 
of his deceased son in any of these actions because of , 
no coverage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE MADDOX JE'EP WAS NOT 
USED uwITH THE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
PERMISSION OF THE OWNER" AS REQUIR-
ED BY WESTERN'S POLICY, RICK LEE AL-
LISON AND HIS ESTATE ARE NOT "INSUR-
EDS" UNDER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY 
.A:ND DAN ALLISON IS NOT PROTECTED UN-
DER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY. 
There is no dispute that Rick Lee Allison was 
potentially an "insured" under the Wes tern policy. 
The applicable policy provisions are: 
V. USE OF OTHER AUTOMOBILE: If the 
named insured is an individual or individual 
and spouse and if dur1ing the policy period such 
named insured or spouse owns a private pas-
senger automobile covered by this policy, such 
insurance as is afforded by this policy under 
Coverages A, B, and Division 1 of Coverage C 
with respect to said automobile applies with 
respect to any other automobile, subject to the 
following provision: 
* * * 
6 
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( d) This insuring agreement does not apply 
to any automobile: 
(1) * * * 
(2) Used without the express or implied 
permission of the owner. 
It is Western's position that the facts of this case 
show that no such permission was ever given to Rick 
Allison. 
The appellant argues that because the Western 
policy did not contain the words "and is within the 
scope of such permission," that the matter of ''scope" 
should not be taken into account by a court in deter-
mining ~'permission." Western contends that these 
additional words are not necessary in an insuring 
agreement since the word ''permission" necessarily 
includes '''scope." This contention is supported by nu-
merous cases throughout the country. In Collins vs. 
New York Casualty Co., 82 S.E.2d 288 (W. Virg. 
1954) a similar argument was made. In this case the 
owner of the car had loaned it to a friend who said 
that he was going to town to collect a debt. The car 
was given with the understanding that it would be 
returned within an hour after the debt had been col-
lected. However, the friend could not find the debtor 
and instead went to a tavern where he became drunk, 
met a friend, and was later involved in an accident 
more than five and a half hours after he had first 
borrowed the car. The "friend" contended he was 
covered under the owner's policy because "the actual 
use of the automobile [was] with the permission of 
7 
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the named insured." The court rejected this argu-
ment. It said: 
The words "with the permission of the in-
sured," in our opinion, are controlling. Cer-
tainly the word "permission" of itself has a 
definite meaning. It has been defined in Black's 
Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1298, as "a 
license to do a thing; an authority to do an act 
which, without such authority, would have 
been unlawful;" and in Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary, Second Edition, Una-
bridged, 1824, the word is defined as an "act 
of permitting; formal consent; authorization; 
leave; license or liberty granted." The very de-
finition of the word ''permission" implies its 
application variously to the things permitted 
1 
to be done by the person granting the permis-
sion, so that inherently the words '''with the 
permission of the insured" in the omnibus 
clause of the instant policy suggests that the ' 
scope of the permission is that which the par-
ties intended." Id at 297 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Continental Casualty Co. vs. Pad-
gett, 219 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1955) that court was 
confronted with the interpretation of a policy which 
provided coverage when "the actual use of the auto-
mobile is by the named assured, or with his permis-
sion." In this case an employee was told by his em-
ployer that he could use company truck to transport 
wood to his mother's house if he would bring the truck 
back to the business. After performing the chore, the 
employee used the truck for his own social purposes 
at which time he was involved in an accident. The 
court rejected the argument that the accident occur-
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
red while the truck was being used with the owner's 
permission. It said : 
The language of the omnibus clause, 
which brings within the coverage of the policy 
any one who uses the insured vehicle with the 
permission of the assured, is clear enough. 
Equally clear is the undisputed testimony that 
Taylor was given permission to use the car 
[truck] for a specific purpose for his own con-
venience after business hours ... [HJ e violat-
ed his instructions, removed the car from the 
parking place and made use of it, not in the 
business of his employer but for the pleasure 
of himself and his friends. It is plain, unless 
the words of the contract are distorted from 
their clear and normal meaning, that the fatal 
ride was not made with the permission of the 
insured within the meaning of the policy. Id. 
at 135. 
In Long vs. Superior Insiirance Co., 230 F.2d 
507 (10th Cir. 1956) the Court of Appeals affirmed 
a lower court decision holding that an omnibus clause 
of an insurance policy [covering any person while 
using the automobile ... provided the actual use of 
the automobile is by the named insured or with his 
permission] did not cover the brother of the named 
insured who was given permission to go to the city 
dump and deliver trash with the insured truck but 
who used the truck for a pleasure trip of his own. The 
court concluded: 
There would seem to be ample evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion that this 
pleasure trip was outside the scope of the per-
missive use of the vehicle ... Id. at 510. 
9 
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In Travelers Insurance Co. vs. Kinney, 238 F. 
Supp. 652 ( D. Mo. 1964) the question of "permis-
sion" once again arose. The permittee, in 'th'is case, 
was given permission to use the owner's car for a 
limited purpose but was instructed to return it after 
such use. When the permittee went to the home of the 
owner to give the car back, the owner was n'ot at , 
home. Instead of leaving the car as instructed, he took 
the car and was involved in an accident while on a 
personal trip of his own. The court said : 
Now here does the record reveal that Shu-
make expressly or impliedly by any language 
or conduct, conferred permission on Kinney to 
use the car after returning it on Christmas 
morning. Quite to the contrary, Kinney had 
specific permission and instructions only to 
use it to drive h'ome on the evening of the 24th 
and to return it that next morning. 
Therefore, the only conclusion that can be 
drawn is that Kinney was not using the car 
with the permission of a named insured under 
the policy at the time of the accident in ques-
tion and therefore was not a permissive user 
within the terms of plaintiff's policy. Id at 653. 
Finally, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Dit-
myer vs. American Liberty Insurance Co., 160 S.E. 
2d 844, 117 Geo. App. 512, ( 1968) faced a similar 
"permission" problem. After the court found that the 
permittee was only given limited permission, but had 
deviated from this permission for his own personal 
use, the court said : 
In the majority of the jurisdictions it is 
10 
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held, as here, that while a slight or inconse-
quential deviation from the permission given 
will not annul the coverage of the omnibus 
clause, there is an absence of permission with-
in the meaning of the policy if the vehicle is 
being driven at a time or a place or for a pur-
pose not authorized by the insured. For a col-
lection and discussion !of the cases and the 
varying rules see 72 A.L.R. 1398-1409; 106 
A.L.R. 1259-1263; 5 A.L.R. 2d 594-668. Id. at 
850 (emphasis added). 
See also Savage vs. American Mutual Liability 
Ins. Co., 182 A.2d 669, 158 Me. 259, (1962); Wil-
limns vs. Travelers Ins. Co., 265 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 
1959) ; Laroche vs. Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Ins. 
Co., 7 A.2d 361 ( 1939) ; Caldwell vs. Standard Acci-
dent Insurance Co., 98 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1938). 
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that 
the ~'scope" of permission is an important factor in 
determining whether there had been "permission" at 
the time of an accident. It seems equally apparent 
that in the case at bar Rick Allison was not within 
the permission given to him by James Maddox. This 
can be seen by reviewing the applicable depositions. 
Q. Okay. Now, Ricky was home, you were on 
the phone - on the telephone at the Ford 
Motor Company and you talked to Ricky? 
A. Right. 
Q. What did you say? 
A. I told him he could use the jeep to milk his 
cows and go back and forth to Christian-
sens. 
11 
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Q. Okay. Did you say anything else? 
A. Yes. I told him I didn't want him driving 
around anyplace else. 
(James Maddox deposition, p. 5, Ins. 
11-19) 
* * * * * * 
Q. Okay. Now, when did you next see Ricky? 
A. My wife and I rode up to his house. This 
was right after lunch. And Ricky was 
standing in front of his house with anoth-
er boy. But - I don't know the Sweat boy, 
but my wife said it wasn't him - said it 
was another boy. She knows him. And she 
was with me when we told him, you know, 
explained to Ricky again that we didn't 
want him to take the jeep anyplace except 
to milk. 
Q. 
(James Maddox deposition p. 6, Ins. 3-9). 
* * * * * * 
Do you know when arrangements were 
made by Ricky to be allowed to use the 
jeep? 
A. Yes. My dad told him he could use it to go 
to milk and back and nothing else. And I 
can remember this particularly because 
one of the reasons he wouldn't let me take 
the jeep that night was because he didn't 
want it running up and down Main Street 
all night long. 
(Steven Maddox deposition, p. 15, Ins. 
9-15). 
Thus, James Maddox specifically gave Rick Al-
12 
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lison permission to use the jeep only for transporta-
tion to his milking job. When Rick used the jeep to 
joy ride in town, he had gone beyond the scope of that 
perm1ss10n. 
POINT II 
STEVEN MADDOX HAD NO AUTHORITY TO 
GIVE RICK ALLISON PERMISSION TO USE 
THE JEEP. 
The fact that Steven Maddox later allowed Rick 
to take the jeep for the purpose of taking the girls 
home had no effect on the initial permission. Steven 
had no authority to change or modify his father's ex-
press pern11ss10n. 
I don't believe that I have the authority-
! just gave it to him. I never - I don't believe 
that I could lend the jeep to anybody I wanted 
to just on the spur of the moment. It wasn't 
mine. I had to have permission everytime I took 
it myself, let alone let anybody else drive it. In 
fact, I wasn't even sure I had permission to 
go take it that night - the first time. (Steven 
Maddox deposition, p. 10, Ins. 5-11). 
For cases holding that the first permittee has 
no authority to delegate the use of the automobile to 
another or to enlarge the permission given by the 
owner to the first permittee, see Norris vs. Pacific 
Indemnity Co., 39 Cal.2d 420, 247 P.2d 1 (1952); 
H elnikamp vs. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 
407 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. Appeals 1966); Civil Service 
Employees Ins. Co. vs. Roberts, 10 Ariz. App. 512, 
460 P.2d 48 (1969); Jones vs. Indiana Lumbermen's 
13 
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Mutual Ins. Co., 161 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1964); In-
demnity Ins. Co. of North America vs. Sanders, 169 
Okla. 378, 36 P.2d 271 (1934); Grange Insurance 
Association vs. Eschback, 1 Wash. App. 230, 460 P.2d 
690 (1969), and Hamm vs. Camerota, 48 Wash.2d 
34, 290 P.2d 713 (1955). 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that 
Steven did have the power to change the permission, 
Rick Allison exceeded that permission as well as the 
permission of James Maddox. At the time Steven 
gave the jeep back to Dan he told him, "Take the 
girls home with it." (Steven Maddox deposition, p. 
27, In. 10). At the time the accident occurred Rick 
had taken the girls home and was "approximately 25 
miles east of Heber City." (Apellant's Brief at 4). 
Thus, the location of the accident was clearly beyond 
the scope of permission given to Rick by Mr. Maddox 
since the initial permission only included a distance 
of one mile. (Steven Maddox deposition, p. 18, In. 1). 
Of course, the permission had also been exceeded in 
regard to time. Rick's job did not begin until 5 :00 
a.m. the morning of May 19, 1968 (Dan Allison de-
position, p. 20) and yet the accident occurred ap-
proximately at 1 :20 a.m. that morning (Trooper Jo-
seph Giles deposition, p. 6, Ins. 12-19). 
Because the accident in question occurred out-
side the scope of permission given to Rick Allison by 
Jam es Maddox, Wes tern had no obligation to def end 
the estate of Rick Allison against any claims brought 
against it. Likewise, Wes tern had no obligation to de-
14 
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fend Dan Allison for any claims brought against him. 
Before liability can be imputed to Mr. Allison under 
the terms of the policy, the condition of "express or 
implied permission of the owner" must be met by the 
permittee. Because this condition was not met by 
Rick Allison, the policy cannot be extended to cover 
Dan Allison. The cases cited by appellant are readily 
distinguishable since in each instance there was no 
question that the permittee was within the permis-
sion granted to him. (See Appellant's Brief a:t 18). 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
THE PERMISSION REQUIRED IS JUSTIFIED 
BY THE LANGUAGE IN THE INSURANCE 
POLICIES AND AGREES WITH THE PUR-
POSES OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY LAWS. 
The appellant argues that requiring "scope of 
permission" to be read into "permission" serves no 
useful purpose "except to enhance the coffers of the 
insurance company." (Appellant's Brief at 19). The 
courts have held that this interpretation serves a 
very useful purpose. 
In these days when reduced premiums are 
being offered to those who maintain a low level 
of accident liability, the abiilty of the insured 
owner to impose effective restrictions on per-
mitted use by another becomes important to 
the insured as well as to the insurer. Savage 
vs. American Miitiwl Liability Ins. Co., 182 
A.2d 669, 671 (Maine 1962). 
In addition, the "scope" requirement makes an owner 
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more careful as to who he will lend his car to. If an 
owner knows that a permittee is likely to go beyond 
the scope of permission which he gives him, the own-
er is much less likely to entrust the car to this per-
mittee if he knows that the insurance will not cover 
any accident which occurs outside the "scope.-'' It is 
highly probable that most car owners equate "per-
mission" and "scope" together when they loan their 
car to a permittee. If, for example, a car owner is 
asked by a police officer whether a permittee had 
permission to use his car at a particular time or 
place, the owner must automatically think of both 
deviation in time and distance in arriving at his an-
swer. When a permittee goes beyond his permission, 
he has gone beyond the desire of the owner to protect 
him. 
The appellant also argues that Rick Allison 
should have been allowed to deviate from his permis-
sion because of an "emergency." Examples are pro-
posed where a permittee comes upon the scene of a 
serious accident or upon stranded accident victims. 
A deviation from the scope of permission in such 
cases could perhaps be justified. However, in the case 
at bar we are not confronted with an "emergency." 
Rather, we are confronted with a situation where 
two boys take a jeep they should not have had at the 
time, use it for purposes completely contrary to the 
wishes of the owner, and take it upon themselves to 
assist strange motorists who have run out of gas 
some 25 miles away. In such a case it can hardly be 
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said that an ~'emergency" existed which justified a 
deviation from the permissive use. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Rick Allison did not have the "express 
or implied permission of the owner" to use the jeep 
at the time of the accident, there was no coverage un-
der W estern's policy for appellant or the estate of his 
deceased son. For this reason the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
GLENN C. HANNI 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Western Casulty and 
Surety Company 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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